Olivier Caleff is a CISO (Cyber-Resilience & Crisis Director) at ERIUM, and an active member of CISO’s associations such as CESIN in France and ECSO in Europe. He has been working in cyber for 30 years, with a clear focus on security watch and incident management. As such, he is a Member of Board of Directors at FIRST, and a SIM3 auditor and trainer. He is very well familiar of both CISO and CSIRT/SOC perspectives. We asked Olivier to consider the pros and cons of CSIRT/SOC for a CISO and here are his thoughts and insights.
Below Olivier expands on the 3 topics:
It is critical for CISOs to get a global understanding and, if required, ask for additional details before taking decisions. Reporting from Security Operations (SecOps) teams, a SOC, or a CSIRT must be well defined to the benefits of the CISO. There are at least 3 elements at stake:
Everything must be defined in advance. It starts with the type, quality, and frequency of data delivery, then the procedures and various communication channels: one for standard in-band communications, and at least one out-of-band or if additional security requirements must be enforced, e.g., in terms of confidentiality.
This will help aggregate elements of context and provide a better understanding. Sharing Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), Indicator of Attack (IOAs) and Indicator of Behaviour (IOBs) is good, but going further is necessary with sharing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). This will help all those who will receive them, and allow for better preparation. In many trusted cyber security communities, the more you share, the more you learn and receive. Sharing is caring.
You cannot simply rely on an organisation, processes, procedures, tools that have been set up some times ago. As the threats are evolving, you must also adapt. So first, you need to assess how mature and aligned your cybersecurity organisation is.
There are at least 2 categories of metrics that should be known:
The former can be known through an objective assessment of the known IT and OT perimeters and provide a real assessment of the knowledge and ability to manage assets in the perimeter of the organisation.
The latter can be achieved with technologies such as the BAS (Breach Attack Simulation) which, thanks to attack simulation in real-life, enables to assess whether detection and reaction security tools have been well tuned, and what is the ability of the teams to behave as expected by detecting and qualifying events into incidents, follow the procedures to escalate to the CISO and act. This is key and this will help detect blind spots in your SOC and CSIRT activities. And this is why BAS and Red Teaming are different.
At least 2 reports published in 2023 (based on the results of hundreds of BAS campaigns) are eye-opening on how organisations fare when it comes to MITRE ATT&CK Tactics. They provide valuable insight of where pain points are and help CISOs, SOCs, and CSIRTs improve their technical and organisation coverage.
What’s in a name? The question relates to the SOC, but in some organisations, SecOps are in the perimeter of a group whose name may vary a lot: SOC, OpsTeam, CyberTeam, or even… CSIRT. What’s important is that all required activities are addressed, all stakeholders work with cooperation in mind. They can even be split between internal or external teams.
Whether these entities should be internal or subcontracted, really depends on the context, the level of expertise of cybersecurity teams, level of maturity, and width of perimeter coverage, just to name a few criteria.
No CISO can afford to skip SecOps, unless the organisation’s governance is to rely on fate being a good provider, betting that attacks will not strike. That said, assessing the maturity and the efficiency of the SecOps teams, and making a lot of efforts in sharing and reporting must be part of the project.
I definitely believe that not having a SecOps teams (whatever name you give it) is like being short-sighted, without glasses… So SecOps should be seen as… the apple of CISO’s eye!